Chapman Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3

Article 13

2009

“The most awful problem that any nation ever
undertook to solve”: Reconstruction as a Crisis in
Citizenship
Allen C. Guelzo

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
Recommended Citation
Allen C. Guelzo, “The most awful problem that any nation ever undertook to solve”: Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship, 12 Chap. L.
Rev. 705 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol12/iss3/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

10/15/2009 6:39 PM

“The most awful problem that any nation
ever undertook to solve”:
Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship
Allen C. Guelzo*
Reconstruction is the step-child of the Civil War, the black
hole of American history.
It lacks the conflict and the
personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the
climactic feuds and battles, and dissipates into a confusing and
wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories, and
embarrassing defeats whose ultimate endpoint is the great
American disgrace—Jim Crow.1 It lives with the short end of the
historical stick for accomplishing too much, then accomplishing
too little, with the result that almost the worst thing that can be
said about someone in American history is that they were
prominent in Reconstruction, since it throws them into the same
mental filing cabinet with Andrew Johnson, Ulysses Grant and
the Ku Klux Klan.2 Its twelve years, from 1865 to 1877, teem
with associations and developments that seem regrettable, if not
absolutely subversive:
The first massive intrusion of federal governmental authority in the
affairs of individuals and the states, beginning with the first and
second Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which effectively reduced all
but one of the states of the defeated Confederacy to the status of
conquered provinces and imposed military occupation of those
states until the civil populations re-wrote their state constitutions
in a way that satisfied Congress;3

* Allen C. Guelzo is the Henry R. Luce Professor of the Civil War Era at Gettysburg
College, and directs the Civil War Era Studies program. He is the winner of the Lincoln
Prize for 2000 and 2005 for Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President and Lincoln's
Emancipation: The End of Slavery in America, and is a member of the National Council
for the Humanities.
1 For a chronicle of the history of Jim Crow see generally JERROLD M. PACKARD,
AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (2003).
2 Id.
3 JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 6–9 (2006).
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The first expansion of the category of civil rights recognized and
enforced by the federal government, and the first limits on other
civil rights (free assembly, legislative independence, freedom of the
press) since the Alien and Sedition Acts;4
Massive and wholesale graft, corruption and fraud in the civil
governments erected by federal force in the rebel states; and (last
but very, very far from least)5
The insertion of race as a political consideration into federal
politics, by treating blacks as a “distinct class” to be protected and
assisted.6

That these initiatives concluded, by 1877, in almost total
failure, is greeted by the political Left with a sense of regret for
the road-not-then-taken, and on the political Right with a sense
of anger that they were ever proposed in the first place. So, on
the one hand, we have Mark Brandon declaring that:
[T]he Constitutional program of the Radicals in Congress—embodied
in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments— proposed
a fundamental alteration of the order’s basic forms and values.
Consequently, the Radicals’ constitutional program supplanted
dominant conventional understandings of the meaning of the original
Constitution.
In the process, it rendered that Constitution
incoherent.7

On the other hand, George P. Fletcher argues that
Reconstruction “enacted a second American constitution,” that
American constitutional law really begins with the 14th
Amendment, and that only in our own times have we shown the
willingness to come to grips with the fact that the Republic of
1789 is dead, and long live 1867:8
This constitutional order stands in radical contrast to the Constitution
drafted in Philadelphia and amended by the Bill of Rights in 1791. It
defines membership in the American nation, it brings the principle of
equality to the fore, and it initiates the process of extending the
franchise to virtually all adult citizens. The original Constitution did
none of these things.9

Is there a better way to look at Reconstruction, which
requires neither the repudiation of Reconstruction nor the
repudiation of the Constitution? Any realistic answer to that
Id.
Id.
6 HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND
FREEDMEN’S RIGHTS, 1861-1866 149 (New York, 2000).
7 MARK E.
BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 207 (1998).
8 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 26 (2001).
9 Id. at 29.
4
5
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question has to begin with a willingness to think about the Civil
War which preceded it as embodying three pivotal questions:
1. Can a democracy—or any form of popular government
that rests ultimate sovereignty in the consent of the
majority—actually work in the way the Founders
planned? Lincoln saw clearly, and from the outset, that
the real issue of the Civil War was the fragility of
democratic process.10 If political minorities, like the
slaveholding South, will always withdraw from the polis
the moment their will is thwarted, then this is a de facto
confession that democracy does not really work, after all.
Nor was Lincoln the only one. George W. Towle, writing
in the Atlantic Monthly in the summer of 1864, warned
that “the failure of man’s self-governing capacity here”
must be “the deathblow to its own hopes” everywhere
else.11 “Our failure will not be fatal to us alone; it will
involve the fate of the millions who are now seeking to
plant themselves against the tremendous force of kingly
and patrician prestige.”12
2. Can democracy endure alongside slavery? Sooner or later,
either recognition of natural rights will correct the
thinking that justifies slavery and abolish it, or natural
rights will wither away and all rights will become
dependent on whomever the exercise of power is pleased
to bestow them.
3. Can democracy succeed in the face of racial, cultural,
linguistic or religious differences?
Or, as William
Grosvenor wrote more bluntly in The New Englander in
October 1865, “How shall we deal with four millions of
liberated blacks?”13 Here, of course, is where the business
of race intrudes its ugly snout. For in the political
environment of slavery, blacks of African descent were the
only permissible objects of enslavement, and in
intellectual environment of the 19th century, widespread
beliefs in white racial supremacy forbade the integration
of blacks and whites on anything approximating civic
equality. One popular solution was colonization.14 But

10

246.

11

DON E. FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT 127 (1987).
G.M. Towle, Our Recent Foreign Relations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1864, at

Id.
William Mason Grosvenor, The Rights of the Nation and the Duty of Congress,
24 NEW ENGLANDER 755, 757 (1865).
14 ALLAN E. YAREMA, AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY: AN AVENUE TO FREEDOM? 26–27
(2006).
12
13
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this so-called solution collided mightily with the fact that
the Civil War had put blacks into federal uniform, and
made highly questionable the justice of denying civil
rights to those who had fought to defend the civic order.15
Still, there was no reason to imagine that racism might
not prove much stronger than logic. No wonder Grosvenor
said, “Rightly considered, it is the most awful problem
that any nation ever undertook to solve.”16
Abraham Lincoln’s answer to the first question was yes, and
so secession had to be resisted; his answer to the second was no,
and so the United States could not limp on indefinitely “halfslave and half-free.” His answer to the third question—which is
really the question of Reconstruction as much as it is a question
of the Civil War—arrived in one word: CITIZEN. It was the word
Lincoln paid to inscribe on the gravestone of his free black valet,
William H. Johnson, who died of smallpox in January 1864,
smallpox he probably caught from Lincoln, who developed a nonlethal form of the disease on his way back from delivering his
address at Gettysburg that November.17
Buried in the
Congressional cemetery, William Johnson’s small white marker
bears only his name and that single word, CITIZEN.18 No one
noticed it then, but that word is the principle at stake in
Reconstruction.
The Constitution does not offer a particularly useful
definition of citizenship; in fact, it does not offer one at all. In the
five places where the word citizen occurs in the Constitution,
three of them are used merely to specify that certain
officeholders must have been “a Citizen of the United States.”19
The other two discuss the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
“Controversies. . . between Citizens of different States; between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects,” and the “Privileges and
Immunities” which “the Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to” enjoy equally with all those of “Citizens in the several
States.”20 So it appeared that two parallel categories existed—
See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
Grosvenor, supra note 13, at 757.
James Oakes, Natural  Rights,  Citizenship  Rights,  States’  Rights,  and  Black  Rights:  Another  
Look at Lincoln and Race, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND HIS WORLD 115–
116 (Eric Foner, ed., 2009).
18 Id.
19 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 and U.S. CONST. art. 2,
§ 1, cl. 5.
20 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2 and U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3. The 11th Amendment
also refers to litigation “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
15
16
17

GUELZO

2009]

10/15/2009 6:39 PM

Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship

709

the category of citizens of the United States and the category of
citizens of individual states—the first of which the Constitution
offered no definition, and the second of which it had no power to
define.
This two-track system of federal and state citizenship may
have seemed more obvious to the Founders than to us, since
citizenship, in its classical and liberal forms, has always had a
certain two-track aspect anyway.21 One of those aspects is
participation: citizenship is what conveys the right to participate
in governance and law-making, the contrast here being between
a citizen who is an agent in self-government and a subject who is
merely ruled. A citizen, in this sense, is a public person,
exercising a public role.22 The other is status: citizenship is what
conveys certain legal protections and a civic identity.23 Looked at
from this perspective, a citizen is a legal member of the polis, and
cannot be molested by his government or any other government
without judicial consequences.24 And in a rough-and-ready way,
federal jurisprudence before the Civil War sorted out the
boundary between federal and state citizenship precisely along
the lines of the participation/status dividing line.
State
citizenship spoke most directly to the rules of civic
participation—hence, it was not only theoretically but practically
possible to exercise certain civil rights, and particularly voting,
within the states without being a citizen of the United States. In
Lincoln’s Illinois, the single requirement for voting was residence
in the state for one year, even though the statutory requirement
for residence under federal naturalization law was five years.25
Hence, white immigrants who would not be deemed naturalized
by the federal government could vote legally in Illinois in the
1850s, provided they could swear an oath to a judge of elections

Foreign State” against the United States, which further aggravates the sense of
Citizenship being a state prerogative. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
21 Michael Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
217–220 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989).
22 Aristotle defines the citizen as someone who “shares in the administration of
justice, and in offices.” THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1177 (Richard McKeon ed.,
1941).
23 Walzer, supra note 21 at 217–220.
24 1 THE POLITICAL WORKS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO: COMPRISING HIS TREATISE
ON THE COMMONWEALTH; AND HIS TREATISE ON THE LAWS 293 (Francis Barham ed., 1841).
Cicero describes citizens in De re publica as those who are protected by “the laws that
constitute just marriages and legitimate progenies, under the protection of the guardian
deities, around the domestic hearths. By these laws, all men should be maintained in
their rights of public and private property. It is only under a good government like this,
that men can live happily—for nothing can be more delightful than a well–constituted
state.” Id.
25 Illegal Voting—An Explanation, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 29, 1858; Act of Jan.
29, 1975, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (repealed 1802).
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that they had been Illinois residents for the previous year.26
Federal citizenship, however, spoke more clearly to status—it
spelled out who could be elected, who could sue in federal courts,
and to whom “Controversies” between competing state
jurisdictions would be referred.27
Even there, however, the Constitution still did not convey a
very adequate notion of what qualified someone to enjoy the
status of federal citizen. The implication of the Constitution,
based on the requirement that the president be a “natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States,” was that federal
citizenship was a matter of jus soli, of being born on the national
land or soil.28 But the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford decision of
1857 inserted the requirement of jus sanguinis—citizenship by
specific birthright—which it then used to deny Dred Scott any
standing in the federal courts as a man of “African descent.”29
And so did many of the state courts: even free blacks, ruled the
North Carolina Supreme Court, “cannot be considered as citizens
in the largest sense of the term.”30 When South Carolina (in the
wake of the Denmark Vesey rebellion plot) required incarceration
of black sailors on ships visiting Carolina ports, a federal district
court ruled that this was a violation of the “privileges and
immunities” clause of the Constitution.31
In other words,
American seamen of whatever race possessed a federal
citizenship status which South Carolina could not arbitrarily
ignore. But this was swept aside by an edict from Andrew
Jackson’s attorney-general (Roger B. Taney, who would also
write the majority opinion in Dred Scott): “The African race in
the United States even when free . . . were not looked upon as
citizens by the contracting parties who formed the
Constitution.”32
So, it might have been possible, on these terms, to have
arrived at the end of the Civil War—to emancipate slaves,
abolish slavery as a legal institution, and re-unify the nation—
and in the process do absolutely nothing about whether the
newly-emancipated slaves were citizens of anything. Possible—
but not likely. By the end of the war, colonization had turned out
Illegal Voting, supra note 25.
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 5.
29 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 HOW.) 393 (1857).
30 State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired) 250 (1844).
31 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (Cir. Ct., D.S.C. 1823).
32 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS 70 (1978); Michael Vorenberg, Reconstruction as a Constitutional
Crisis, in RECONSTRUCTIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTBELLUM UNITED STATES
167 (Thomas J. Brown ed., 2006).
26
27
28
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to be a “humbug,” and 180,000 free blacks stood in federal
uniforms and had earned federal honors for their fighting.33
There was also a political consideration in the minds of the
victorious Republican party that urged them to establish a
definition of citizenship which embraced both status and
participation.34 Practically speaking, the end of slavery meant
an end to the 3/5ths clause in the Constitution; and far from that
being the end of a racial humiliation for blacks, what it meant
politically was that the Southern states could now return to
Congress, demanding full (rather than 3/5ths) representation for
their black population, without actually giving those blacks the
right to vote for the now-increased representation the South
would enjoy.35 Tactically speaking, it would be possible for the
white South to emerge from the Civil War in an even stronger
position in Congress than it had enjoyed before the war, with
blacks still disenfranchised, but their numbers now awarding
Southern states larger delegations in the House of
Representatives. The result would be the rolling-back of every
initiative the Republicans had achieved in their brief dominance
of the wartime Congress—protective tariffs, government
assistance to the railroads, the homestead act, the national
banking system—as well as assumption of the Confederate war
debt.
On the other hand, if the freedman could be transitioned
from non-citizen to citizen, then (promised Frederick Douglass)
“he will raise up a party in the Southern States among the poor,
who will rally with him,” and so establish a long-term Republican
political hegemony in the formerly all-Democratic South.36 But
this would go for nothing if, with the end of hostilities, political
pardons were handed out widely to former rebels, allowing them
to mobilize their old pre-war political resources and get
themselves elected to Congress; and if blacks could be confined to
a no-man’s-land where they were no longer slaves but not legally

33 Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White Disenfranchisement: Populism, Race, and
Class, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 23, 44 (2002).
34 Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African Americans, Rights
Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2120 (1996).
35 Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to
Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92
GEO. L. J. 259, 265 (2004).
36 Interview with a Colored Delegation Respecting Suffrage, in THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION
1865–1870 55 (Edward McPherson ed., Da Capo Press, Inc. 1972) (1871); HEATHER COX
RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA AFTER THE
CIVIL WAR 52 (2007); KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877 96
(Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1965); GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 33 (2006).
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citizens of either the states or the federal Union. Sure enough,
no sooner had Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and Southern
Unionist, been sworn in as president after the assassination of
Lincoln, than Johnson, on May 29, 1865, issued a broadly-drawn
amnesty proclamation, offering pardons to all but the uppermost
echelons of the former Confederate leadership—and even they
were permitted by “special application” to be pardoned.37 And to
smooth the path to restoration, Johnson added a series of
proclamations, appointing interim provisional governors and
urging the writing of new state constitutions based upon the
voter qualifications in force at the time of secession in 1861—
which meant, in large but invisible letters, NO BLACKS.38
What this insured was that Reconstruction would be fought
as a struggle over citizenship—in effect, to settle whether
citizenship could trump race in the same way, at the time of the
Founding, it had trumped religion, through the First
Amendment. So, from the moment it became clear that Andrew
Johnson intended nothing more than the re-creation of the prewar status quo, minus only slavery, the Republican congressional
leadership—Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania in the House,
Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts in the
Senate—reached over Johnson’s hands, first to replace the old
Confederate order with a free-labor economy, and then to define
citizenship in such a way as to secure the freedmen’s place within
the politics and economy of a new South.39
It is a good measure of how critical the notion of citizenship
was to Reconstruction that the first resistance the exConfederates offered took the form, not of the race war that had
been so often predicted as the likeliest result of emancipation,
but of guarding the precincts of participation in the states from
black intrusion.40 The “Black Codes” enacted in the wake of
Johnson’s amnesty proclamation were aimed at defining blacks
as ‘vagrants’ or ‘paupers’ who could be excluded from citizenship
by excessive poll taxes, forbidding black-white intermarriage,
curtailments of free speech (including “insulting gestures”), and
most ominous of all, ownership of “fire-arms of any kind, or any
ammunition, dirk or bowie knife.”41 It also underscores the
37 By the President of the Untied States of America: A Proclamation, in 6 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 310–12
(James B. Richardson ed., 1897).
38 Id. at 313–14.
39 Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1008–10 (2002)
40 The Freedmen: Laws of the Southern States Concerning Them, NEW YORK
TIMES, June 10, 1866, at 6.
41 Id., MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, COMMISSIONER BUREAU OF REFUGEES,
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centrality of the place of citizenship in any discussion of
Reconstruction to notice that the first objections from
Republicans, when the first session of the new 39th Congress
assembled in December 1865, were also based on citizenship. “I
deny the right of these States to pass these laws against men
who are citizens of the United States,”42 erupted Henry Wilson,
seconded by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who introduced a Civil
Rights bill just after the New Year which contained a forthright
definition of federal citizenship, based on jus soli: “[A]ll persons
born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States,” declared the new bill, “and such citizens, of
every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”43 Offences against those rights would be adjudicable in
federal courts.44
But this would require some serious re-negotiating of the
assumptions about citizenship which had prevailed up until the
Civil War. Wilson was promptly interrupted by John Sherman of
Ohio, who pointed out that “[t]here is scarcely a State in the
Union that does not make distinctions on account of color . . . Is it
the purpose of this bill to wipe out all these distinctions?”45 And
in the House of Representatives, Wisconsin Democrat Charles
Eldridge accused the promoters of the civil rights bill of an
“insidious and dangerous” plan to “lay prostrate at the feet of the
Federal Government the judiciary of the States.”46 The only
citizenship Eldridge knew was the citizenship of the states: “I
hold that the rights of the States are the rights of the Union, that
the rights of the States and the liberty of the States are essential
to the liberty of the individual citizen.”47
Trumbull’s civil rights bill was eventually passed in March
1866, but finally stopping short of including among the rights of
federal citizenship the right to vote.48 Andrew Johnson vetoed it
anyway on March 27th.49 Granting federal citizenship to “our
FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, LAWS IN RELATION TO FREEDMEN, S. Exec. Doc. No.
6, at 170, 192-99 (39th Cong. 2d Sess. 1867); JOHN C. RODRIGUE, RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
CANE FIELDS: FROM SLAVERY TO FREE LABOR IN LOUISIANA’S SUGAR PARISHES 1862–1880
67 (2001).
42 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41–42 (1865).
43 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
44 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877
243 (1988).
45 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41–42 (1865).
46 Id. at 1154.
47 Id.
48 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, supra note 45.2.
49 To the Senate of the United States, in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 413 (James B. Richardson ed., 1897).
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entire colored population” when the states had refused to do
likewise in terms of state citizenship, argued Johnson, either
made federal citizenship null and void, or else overrode state
citizenship to the point where it was a useless concept.50 And it
was clearly the latter which Johnson saw as the bill’s strategy:
“Federal law, whenever it can be made to apply, displaces State
law” and interferes with “relations existing exclusively between a
State and its citizens.”51 Congress ignored him and overrode the
veto.52
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a landmark in the
expansion of the notion of federal citizenship, because it forced
into the open for the first time since the Constitutional
Convention the inherently problematic linkage of the divided
sovereignty of the states and the Union, and the divided tracks of
a citizenship of status and a citizenship of participation. The
argument of Andrew Johnson and the wartime Democrats in
Congress implied that state citizenship covered virtually every
ground worth calling citizenship—office-holding, contract,
marriage, and, of course, voting. But what this left as the realm
of federal citizenship was anyone’s guess. The opponents of the
civil rights bill and other Reconstruction legislation were
opposing federal jurisdiction over both rights of participation as
well as status. If participation and status were up to the states
to define, was there any worthwhile meaning to the phrase,
‘citizen of the United States’? It had been the plea of Charles
Sumner in 1854, in his provocative speech on “The Crime
Against Kansas,” that the crime of Gaius Verres—which had
been that he ignored his victim’s protest, civis Romanus sum—
was not less treasonous than the depredations of pro-slavery
Border Ruffians who ignored their victims’ protests of “I am an
American citizen.”53 That plea got Sumner assaulted on the floor
of the Senate; those who opposed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866
were, if only metaphorically, doing much the same.54
One solution to the deadlock over state and federal
citizenship in the former Confederacy was to deny that the onetime Confederate states were any longer states of the Union—
that they had, in effect, committed state-suicide by secession, and
were to be governed as the western territories were governed,

Id. at 406.
Id. at 410, 413.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 313, 344 (1866).
THE CRIME AGAINST KANSAS: SPEECH OF HON. CHARLES SUMNER, IN THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 19TH AND 20TH MAY, 1856 4–5 (1856).
54 Id.
50
51
52
53
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directly by federal law.55 In turn, then, federal citizenship could
assume the burden of defining both status and participation for
the inhabitants of the occupied Confederacy. This was the
strategy behind the two Reconstruction Acts of March and July
1867, which declared that “no legal state governments or
adequate protection for life or property now exists” in any of the
old Confederate states except Tennessee and reduced them to
“military districts” where “civil tribunals” would operate only at
the behest of the military district commander.56 But even before
the bills were passed, they were placed under fire from a new
quarter, the Supreme Court, which released its opinions in Ex
parte Milligan in December, 1866.57 Ex parte Milligan reversed
the convictions of Lambdin Milligan and two others who had
been imprisoned by a federal military tribunal in 1864, and thus
called into question the entire constitutional legitimacy of
military authority.58 Fearful that “the first time that the South
with their copperhead allies obtain[ed] command of Congress,”
they would repeal the civil rights bill and appeal to the Court to
overturn the Reconstruction Acts, congressional Republicans
leapt ahead in the second session of the 39th Congress to armorplate the status of federal citizenship with two amendments to
the Constitution,59 the fourteenth (which eliminated any
distinction between state and federal citizenship and welded
them together on the basis of jus soli: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside”60) and the fifteenth in 1869 (which annexed
participation to federal citizenship by preventing any state or
federal authority from denying the right to vote on account “of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude”).61 This was, as
future president James Garfield announced in the House, the
first time that the federal government “proposes to hold over
every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting
shield of law.”62 Taken together, the Reconstruction amendments
cemented firmly into place the basic Republican conviction that
“no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic, but
what arose from merit and conduct.”63
55 OriginalIntent.Org, Original Intent Treatise, Citizenship,
http://www.originalintent.org/edu/citizenship.php (last visited August 1, 2009).
56 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
57 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
58 Id. at 135.
59 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
62 James Garfield, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866).
63 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).
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Although the Democratic opposition raged that the
Reconstruction amendments were nothing but what Garret Davis
of Kentucky called “a bald, naked attempt to usurp power and to
bring all the sovereign and reserved powers of the States to the
foot of a tyrannical and despotic faction in Congress,” and that it
gave the vote “to a race of men who throughout their whole
history, in every country and condition in which they have ever
been placed, have demonstrated their utter inability for selfgovernment,” it was ultimately neither a demonic thirst for
centralized government nor an idealized passion for racial
egalitarianism which were the drivers of that opposition, but the
question of citizenship.64
Even some of the most radical
Republicans were surprisingly uninterested in turning their
Reconstruction legislation into a social revolution.65
“This
doctrine does not mean that a negro shall sit on the same seat or
eat at the same table with a white man,” Thaddeus Stevens
replied in 1867, “[t]hat is a matter of taste which every man must
decide for himself. The law has nothing to do with it.”66 But
insofar as the black man born in the United States and the white
man born in the United States were considered politically equal,
their identity was based, not on being black or white, but on
being citizens.67
Unhappily, the history of Reconstruction—like more recent
reconstructions—contains within itself a warning that bills and
amendments do not carry with them guarantees about security.68
Military reconstruction was pock-marked by racial violence in
Southern cities, aimed largely at intimidating blacks from voting
and restricting them to various forms of economic peonage.69
Congress attempted to contain the violence with the three Force
Acts of 1870 and 1871; and Ku Klux Klan violence ensured the
election of Republican governments in the former Confederate
states, and of Ulysses Grant in 1868 and 1872.70 But by 1876,
many of the old wartime Republican guard were gone—Thaddeus
Stevens died in 1868, Henry Wilson left the Senate in 1872 to
run as Grant’s vice-president, and died in 1875, and Charles

64 Garrett Davis, Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1630–31 (1869); on the larger
context of the conservatism of Reconstruction, see Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the
Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. Am. Hist. 65, 83–84(
1974).
65 ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE 113 (2005).
66 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 252–53 (1867).
67
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68 FONER, supra note 65, at 194–95.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 171, 175, 177–80.
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Sumner died in 1874.71 Also gone was the Republican majority in
the House, which was replaced in 1874 by the first Democratic
majority since the beginning of the Civil War, and the
Republican majority in the Senate, which was lost in the
elections of 1878.72 By then, the full weight of an unsympathetic
Supreme Court had finally descended in the Slaughter-House
Cases, which re-established “that there is a citizenship of the
United States, and a citizenship of the State, which are distinct
from each other.”73 Hence, the “privileges and immunities”
attached to federal citizenship had no application to state
governments.74 The second blow came in U.S. v. Cruikshank in
1875, which re-affirmed Slaughter-House Cases and added that
“the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right
of suffrage upon any one, and that the United States have no
voters of their own creation in the States.”75 An effort to
circumvent Cruikshank, in the form of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, lasted only until 1883, when the Supreme Court
overturned the Act in the Civil Rights Cases.76
By that time, even the Republican faithful had lost heart in
the fight. The Panic of 1873 pulled the financial rug from under
the government’s resources, and the cries for help from southern
blacks for government intervention increasingly came to sound in
Republican ears like the demands of populist farmers for
currency inflation or unionized workers for economic regulation.77
“Is it not time for the colored race to stop playing the baby?”
asked the Chicago Tribune irritably in 1875.78 Finally, the deal
struck by the electoral compromise of 1877, which gave the
presidency to Rutherford B. Hayes and mandated the withdrawal
of the last Reconstruction military authorities; in their absence, a
lethal combination of strong-arm politicking and economic
fragility sent the feeble Reconstruction state governments
crashing down.79 Not until 1888 would Republicans regain
sufficient numbers in Congress to renew their efforts to interpose
federal supervision of Southern voting with a fresh “Force Bill,”
71 Id. at 146; RICHARD NELSON CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE CARPET BAGGERS: A
REINTERPRETATION 278, 285 (1988).
72 FONER, supra note 65, at 190; Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas
Jefferson Counts Himself Into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 635 n.232 (2004).
73 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873).
74 Id.
75 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
76 FONER, supra note 65, at 194; HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF
RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901
150 (2001).
77 RICHARDSON, supra note 76, at 137.
78 Id.
79 FONER, supra note 65, at 198.
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drafted by Henry Cabot Lodge.80 The bill passed the House, only
to die a lingering death in the Senate.81 It had all been, in the
memorable title of Judge Albion Tourgee’s memoir, “A Fool’s
Errand.”82
We should not fool ourselves, however, into thinking that
this was an unavoidable, much less an appropriate, conclusion to
Reconstruction. Although Reconstruction has more recently been
portrayed as a kind of radical fairy-tale, or a Paris Commune in
gumbo, Reconstruction’s fundamental issue—citizenship, rather
than race or centralization, or even civil rights—was a
profoundly conservative one.83 The kind of citizenship imagined
by the Reconstruction Republicans is based on the jus soli and by
the rational assent to a series of propositions (starting with the
natural rights proposition of the Declaration of Independence,
that all men are created equal), not blood, soil, race or ethnicity,
the jus sanguinis so beloved of German Romanticism.84 The cry,
I am an American citizen, is what must make any power stand
down, whether it comes in the form of centralized federal
governments or (what is no less exempt from the blandishments
of power) centralized state governments, centralized municipal
governments, boss-driven school boards, or one-party faculties.85
Writing online for his magazine, The American Interest, Francis
Fukuyama has said:
Americans traditionally distrust strong central government, and
champion a federalism that distributes powers to state and local
governments. The logic of wanting to move government closer to the
people is strong, but we often forget that tyranny can be imposed by
local oligarchies as much as by centralized ones. In the history of the
Anglophone world, it is not the ability of local authorities to check the
central government, but rather a balance of power between local
authorities and a strong central government, that is the true cradle of
liberty.86

80 Edward E. Purcell., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An
Essay on Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1994–1995
(2003).
81 Id.
82 EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 50–51 (1992); RICHARD NELSON CURRENT, THOSE TERRIBLE
CARPETBAGGERS: A REINTERPRETATION 368–375 (1988).
83 WILLIAM C. HARRIS, WITH CHARITY FOR ALL: LINCOLN AND THE RESTORATION OF
THE UNION 262 (1997); ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 111 (1987).
84 Steve D. Shadowen, et al., No Distinctions Except Those Which Merit Originates:
The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private Universities, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 51, 92, 93 (2009).
85 THE CRIME AGAINST KANSAS, supra note 53 at 5.
86 Francis Fukuyama, Strong States and Liberty, THE AMERICAN INTEREST
ONLINE, Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://the-american-interest.com/contd/?p=648.
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The price we have paid for ignoring this balance lives on not
only in the ugly history of poll taxes, literary tests and
grandfather clauses, but also in the federal overreach with which
that history has been responded to, in the form of racial
gerrymandering and proportional representation schemes.
Neither the illness or its maladroit cure—whether local or
federal—has much to offer beside the fundamental honor of
citizenship; and refusing to recognize the implications of civis
Americanus sum in the era of Reconstruction is what has helped
bring us to our present muddled condition over voting rights,
statistical “triggers,” and the racial balkanization of the nation.87
At the end of the day, there is only one political honor any
American should aspire to, and only one political privilege that
any of us should be permitted to enjoy, and it is contained in that
singular and laconic word that President Lincoln engraved on
William Johnson’s headstone: CITIZEN.

87 Abigail Thernstrom, Reviewing (and Reconsidering) the Voting Rights Act, 7
ENGAGE 35, 35–36 (2006).

